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SUmmARy
The planned Iran-Pakistan-India natural-gas pipeline (IPI Pipeline) has been in 
the Asian spotlight for many years and its full realisation would be politically 
ground-breaking. Its energy-supply route is planned to cross the political fault 
line between the two rivals Pakistan and India, who would thus be bound to 
cooperate with one another. In fact, planning the Pipeline is the first time in 
history that the two countries have ever even negotiated on a trilateral project. 
Additionally, intricate Iran-Pakistan relations may well improve.
Although negotiations over the IPI Pipeline started more than a decade 
ago, the project has still not been realised, despite it apparently being a win-
win situation for all the parties involved. A wide range of serious challenges 
have emerged since the birth of the Pipeline idea and this article looks into the 
economic, political, regional and global obstacles the project faces, and explores 
alternative, and perhaps more likely, versions of the original trilateral project.
But even a less ambitious outcome would have clear merits: regardless of 
whether the Pipeline materialises in the form in which it was initially proposed, 
negotiations over it have already produced spillover effects in key sectors, such 
as diplomacy and economics. This is the main argument of this article, as it 
examines both current and potential spillover effects in the future from the Pipe-
line project. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
We have a great deal of respect and love for the people of India and Pakistan. We 
look upon them as our own people. We are very interested in this [Iran-Pakistan-
India] pipeline being constructed. [...] We want this pipeline to be the pipeline of 
brotherhood and peace.2
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran
To strengthen our efforts for peace we seek to actively promote projects that are 
vital to the economic development of the region. The Iran-India-Pakistan Gas 
Pipeline is such a project that is of utmost importance to the growing energy 
needs of both Pakistan and India.3
Khurshid M. Kasuri, Pakistani foreign minister
If this [the Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline project] is a project which 
will enhance India’s energy security. If it is a project which is going to be eco-
nomical from India’s point of view, certainly, it would [be] in our national inter-
est and we would go ahead with it. [sic]4
Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary
The planned Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline (IPI Pipeline) has been 
in the Asian spotlight for many years. Since 2005, the governments in Tehran, 
Islamabad, and New Delhi have held a number of bilateral and trilateral nego-
tiations which, contrary to what many expected, have been successful in several 
ways.
A full realisation of the IPI Pipeline would be ground-breaking politically. 
First, its energy supply route is planned to cross the political fault line between 
the two rivals, Pakistan and India. In fact, its planning is the first time in history 
that these two countries have ever embarked on negotiating a trilateral project.5 
1 A special thanks to Sven Holtsmark, Øystein Tunsjø, Eirik L. Sagen, Ole Kristian 
Holthe, Annika Evensen, Kjetil Selvik, Stig Stenslie and the Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies for supporting me throughout this project. 
2 Interview with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran. Siddharth Varadarajan 
and John Cherian, “We are still interested in dialogue based on justness and fairness”, 
Hindu, 10 August 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
3 Quote by Khurshid M. Kasuri, Pakistani foreign minister. “Press Trust of India 
– Siachen progress needed for peace process: Pak”, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 31 January 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
4 Quote by Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary. “IAEA vote not to affect 
pipeline plans with Iran”, Press Trust of India, 26 September 2005, (Indian Express 
Newspaper [online 18 June 2008]).
5 Interview in Tehran, 10 September 2006.
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Second, relations between Iran and Pakistan have not exactly been smooth at all 
times. For these reasons, the pipeline has been nicknamed “the Peace Pipeline”.
I would argue that even a less ambitious outcome would have clear mer-
its: regardless of whether the IPI Pipeline does materialise as initially proposed, 
the negotiations surrounding it have already produced spillover effects in key 
sectors, both diplomatic and economic ones. Multinational pipeline projects 
have the potential to create new economic and political patterns of cooperation 
between energy-producing states, energy transit states and energy-consuming 
states. This might lead to increased understanding, trust and interdependence, 
which in turn could strengthen security cooperation between nations. In this 
particular case, the IPI Pipeline might strengthen the political bonds between 
Iran, Pakistan and India, and thus ultimately reduce the risk of conflict. 
This study explores alternative versions of the original trilateral project, which, 
in spite of the IPI Pipeline apparently being a win-win situation for all parties 
involved, has faced serious challenges; although negotiations started more than 
a decade ago, the pipeline has still not been realised. Soon after the project idea 
was proposed, it was put on ice for many years due to tensions between India 
and Pakistan, and negotiations did not resume before 2004–2005. In the last 
few years countries, precisely such as those of India and Pakistan, in need of 
energy to maintain rapid economic growth have made energy security a top pri-
ority, and this is one factor that has resuscitated the project. In addition, Iran has 
been facing considerable political and economic pressure from the international 
community due to its nuclear programme. As the holder of 16 per cent of the 
world’s proven natural-gas reserves, it can see its chance to earn fast cash and 
tighten its friendships with eastern countries through the IPI project. 
In the first part of this case study, which outlines the background, I shall 
briefly look at each of the bilateral relations in the Iran-Pakistan-India triangle. 
Thereafter, I place the IPI Pipeline in a broader context and look at how the 
idea of the pipeline emerged and created the potential for multilateral energy 
cooperation. In the second part, I move on to identify different types of obstacles 
to the pipeline: economic and political ones, and the additional challenges of 
Baluch insurgency and US opposition. In the third part, I name three alternative 
scenarios to the IPI Pipeline and assess the probability of each of them. Before 
drawing a conclusion in part four, I explore how energy security can lead to new 
patterns of cooperation, which in turn might spill over to other sectors in the 
form of bilateral and trilateral cooperation, even between former foes. 
I have chosen to make all people I have interviewed during a stay in Iran 
anonymous. In my view, their opinions are very credible, as they come from 
high-ranking Indian, Iranian and Pakistani officials and consultants from recog-
nised oil and gas agencies. 
Map 1: IPI Pipeline Route (IEmap/B.K. Sharma)
0
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BACkGROUND
The plan is to take the IPI Pipeline through three countries which have three very 
different types of governments: the theocracy of Iran, the military dictatorship 
of Pakistan and the democracy of India. Although bilateral relations between 
these countries vary, there has been a shared tendency in recent years for shift-
ing tempers; to different extents, all three sets of relations have seen both good 
and bad days.
Troubled Relations
Of these countries’ relations with each other, the Indo-Pakistani has historically 
been the most conflict-ridden. Even though India and Pakistan share the same 
origin, history, culture and language, much has happened since their religiously 
initiated partition in 1947 when the British Raj left the Indian subcontinent. 
There are four main causes for their troublesome relationship today: the prime 
factor of conflict between the arch rivals is the disputed areas of Jammu and 
Kashmir, which led to war between the two countries in 1947 and 1965, and 
which was much to blame for the escalation of the Kargil conflict in 1999. The 
second point of friction is militant Islamist groups in Pakistan and nationalistic 
militant Hindu groups in India; for instance, militant Islamists were responsible 
for the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and Hindu militants attacked 
and killed hundreds of Muslims in the Indian Gujarat in 2002. Third, in the 
last few years, Islamabad and New Delhi have been engaged in a missile and 
nuclear-arms race. Neither of them has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
in 1998 both countries carried out underground nuclear-bomb tests. The final 
factor is dissatisfaction with their respective alliances; India considers China its 
main competitor in Asia, whereas China and Pakistan share very warm rela-
tions and cooperate within several sectors, including the military one, which has 
both worried and irritated New Delhi. There have been several attempts at rap-
prochement between India and Pakistan, though mostly in vain; such attempts 
often ended in more unrest. However, in the last 4–5 years Indo-Pakistani rela-
tions do seem to have warmed up.
In 2003, Iran and India launched a strategic partnership and signed the 
joint “New Delhi Declaration” in which it is stated that they are 
Conscious of the vast potential in the political, economic, transit, transport, 
energy, industries, science and technology and agricultural fields and of the ben-
efits of cooperative endeavour, [d]etermined to build a strong, modern, contem-
porary and cooperative relationship that draws upon their [Iran’s and India’s] 
historical and age-old cultural ties, the advantage of geographical proximity, 
and that responds to the needs of an inter-dependent world of the 21st Century, 
[a]ware that their strengthened bilateral relations also contribute to regional 
cooperation, peace, prosperity and stability […].6
The two countries have mostly had friendly relations. Although at a low level, 
Iran and India have cooperated in the defence and military sectors over the last 
two decades. Other important areas of cooperation include the making of a 
joint Central Asian strategy and securing the sea lines of communication in the 
Persian Gulf; India also has several infrastructural projects in Iran, including the 
development of the Chahbahar port near the border of Pakistan, and the two 
countries have signed large contracts on energy cooperation.7 Through Chahba-
har and Iran, India can see an opportunity for it to get land access to Afghani-
stan and Central Asia, something Pakistan has not offered. Also, the port of 
Chahbahar has a strategic position for monitoring oil- and gas-shipping traffic 
through the Gulf of Oman, not far from the competing Chinese-supported Port 
Gwadar in Pakistan. It is only in recent years that the Indo-Iranian relation-
ship has been facing serious difficulties: the civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the US and India in 2005, and the signing of the deal in 2006, compli-
cated relations. Probably due to pressure from the US, India voted against Iran 
on an IAEA resolution in 2005 that found Iran to be in non-compliance with 
its international obligations, leaving the Islamic Republic feeling betrayed. The 
following year, India again voted against Iran on a new IAEA resolution which 
recommended Iran’s nuclear programme be referred to the UN Security Coun-
cil. In its efforts to isolate Iran, the US has been pushing India to abandon all 
thoughts of cooperation with Iran, including the energy sector. India’s strategic 
partnership with the US has also led to enhanced relations between India and 
Israel, another delicate issue in Iran.
As for Iranian-Pakistani relations, Tehran was the first to recognise the 
newly independent state of Pakistan in 1947, and Pakistan was the first country 
to recognise the Islamic Republic in 1979. The two Muslim states have mostly 
enjoyed a close and peaceful relationship. Despite Iran having a Shiite Muslim 
majority and Pakistan a Sunni one, Islamic identity has been an important factor 
in defining the relations between them. One of the two countries’ shared incen-
tives for cooperation has been to stabilise the Pakistani and Iranian provinces 
of Baluchistan. In the late 1970s, Pakistan, assisted by the Iranian army, ended 
6 “The Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Iran ‘The New Delhi 
Declaration’”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 25 January 2003 [online 18 June 
2008].
7 Pramit Mitra and Vibhuti Haté, “India-Iran Relations: Changing the Tone?”, South 
Asia Monitor, no. 92 (8 March 2006), (Center for Strategic and International Studies      
[online 18 June 2008]).    
3/2008 uS POLIcy tOwarD ruSSIa after 9/11
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a powerful separatist insurgency in the Baluchi areas. In the 1990s, however, 
two factors altered Iranian-Pakistani relations: first, there was a rise in anti-Shi-
ite groups in Pakistan, which were also blamed for the assassination of Iran’s 
Council General in Lahore in 1990; second, the Soviet military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan brought forth differences between Iran and Pakistan in their views 
on Afghanistan. Iran wished to increase its influence in the country and groom 
especially the interests of the Hazara Shiites, whereas Pakistan, along with Saudi 
Arabia and the US, supported the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. With the instal-
lation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Iranian-Pakistani relations 
deteriorated further. The Taliban not only massacred thousands of Hazaras, 
but also murdered Iranian diplomats. In addition to Afghanistan, the two coun-
tries have competed to increase their influence in the newly independent Central 
Asian countries. After 9/11 and the fall of Taliban, relations between Iran and 
Pakistan have improved somewhat, though some tensions remain as Pakistan 
has formed a strategic partnership with the US, and Indo-Iranian relations have 
been improving.
Fuelling Growth
The IPI Pipeline must be analysed within the broader context of Asia’s current 
economic development. The economies of Asian countries such as India and 
Pakistan are growing rapidly, but this will be unsustainable without enough en-
ergy, of which both countries will face a shortage in the near future. The energy 
consumption of India and Pakistan is expected to double within 2020.8 Today, 
India is the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, and its energy consumption 
is expected to increase from 12.7 quadrillion Btu in 2000 to 27.1 Btu in 2025.9 
After China, this is the largest expected increase in energy use.10 In spite of India 
having found new reserves of natural gas in recent years, its actual increase in 
domestic gas supply will probably be much less than demand, and it will have to 
import more and more energy. Hence, energy security is one of the top priorities 
on the Indian and Pakistani political agendas.
South Asian leaders have shown great interest in signing contracts with 
Middle Eastern countries that are rich in energy resources. Iran is the first run-
ner-up in the world in terms of both oil and gas resources. Accordingly, the 
country is a very attractive cooperation partner in the field of energy and, in-
8 Øystein Noreng, “The Rise of Asia and the Restructuring of International Oil Trading: 
Neo-mercantilism versus Globalization?” The Journal of Energy and Development, 
vol. 2, no. 30 (2005), p. 8.
9 Multiply 1 trillion British thermal units (Btu) by 0.028 to get billion cubic metres 
(bcm).
10 Mitra and Haté, “India-Iran Relations: Changing the Tone?”
deed, over the last few years, Iran, in its search for new strategic partners, has 
developed an energy-exporting policy that “looks towards the East”. India, for 
instance, put its stake in long-term cooperation with Iran when the Indian Oil 
Corporation in June 2005 signed an LNG deal with the National Iranian Gas 
Exporting Company, which will supply India with gas for 25 years starting in 
2009–2010.11 In Pakistan’s case, the largest energy contract with Iran will be the 
prospective IPI Pipeline. The Russian gas company Gazprom has also shown 
interest in supporting the project with both financial resources and technology.12 
Due to sky-high energy prices, Russian companies like Gazprom have accumu-
lated large revenues and one of the reasons why companies like Gazprom wish 
to invest their surplus outside of Russia in countries with big oil and gas reserves 
is to increase their income. Russian efforts to get involved in countries such as 
Algeria and Iran can also help Russia pay close attention to the countries’ energy 
policies and thereby avoid their competition.13
China has also shown an interest in the pipeline. The former Chinese am-
bassador to India, Sun Yuxi, stated in April 2005:
As far as the extension of the Iran-India gas pipeline to China is concerned, Bei-
jing does not have any political problem with it, finding it a very good idea.14 
An extension of the pipeline from India to China is, however, neither likely nor 
viable to this day, though China might get hold of the gas through other means, 
which will be dealt with later in this article.
According to a well-informed Iranian source, consortiums of consulting 
engineers and individuals have been studying the pipeline project for Pakistan 
and India separately. In addition, according to the source, an Islamic bank and/
or other countries will contribute to the budget for the Pakistani part of the IPI 
Pipeline.15 Iran, Pakistan and India all seem to be interested in Russian involve-
ment in the project.16 In 2007, an official from the World Bank said that the 
bank was ready to be a stakeholder in the natural gas project.17
11 Ibid.
12 Pepe Escobar, “The Roving Eye: Russia and Iran Lead the New Energy Game”, Asia 
Times Online, 14 July 2006 [18 June 2008].
13 Interview in Oslo, November 2006.
14 Quote by Sun Yuxi, Chinese Ambassador to India. “Iran-India-China Gas Pipeline 
Idea”, ArabicNews, 29 April 2005 [online 18 June 2008].
15 Interview in Tehran, November 2006.
16 “India Welcomes Russian Interest in IPI Pipeline”, Kayhan International, 11 
November 2006.
17 “Editorial: How real is the Iranian pipeline?”, Daily Times, 3 March 2007, 
(WorldCALL Internet Solutions [online 18 June 2008]).
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Pipeline Dreams
The idea of the pipeline grew out of several plans to transport natural gas from 
the Arabian Peninsula to the Asian market in the late 1980s. One idea was to 
transport gas from Qatar through Iran to Pakistan, through the so-called Gulf 
South Asia Pipeline (GUSA), and an Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between Pakistan and Qatar in 1991.18 It has always been challenging for Qatar, 
one of the world’s biggest gas producers, to transport its gas abroad. It has two 
major ways of exporting gas, either by tank ship or pipeline. The latter solution 
was preferred for many years due to the high expense of and potential risks 
involved in tank-ship transport. In recent years, the situation has become less 
clear. Notably, whereas piracy attacks on tank-ship transport have decreased in 
recent years, the risk of terrorist activities against such transportation has in-
creased.19 At the same time, shipping has become less costly. One alternative to 
seaborne gas transportation from Qatar to the Asian market would be to build 
a pipeline under the Gulf to Iran and eastwards from that point; the Gulf is only 
200–300 metres deep, ideal for building pipelines. Another possible route is a 
pipeline from Qatar through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Oman, and on 
from the Sultanate under the Arabian Ocean to Pakistan.
Two factors, however, have made the construction of such a pipeline dif-
ficult and put the project on hold. First, Saudi Arabia owns a little piece of land 
between Qatar and the UAE, and this apparently minor detail complicates the 
situation: the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been tense since 
the 1990s, when certain border disputes arose between Saudi Arabia’s al-Saud 
dynasty and Qatar’s al-Thani family. It seems safe to conclude that no pipeline 
through Saudi Arabia will be built until the two countries have come to terms. 
Second, the ocean areas outside the Strait of Hormuz reach depths of up to 1800 
metres: pressure at such depths would make building a pipeline difficult, even 
with cutting-edge technology.20 The Pakistanis were also interested in building a 
pipeline from Oman to Pakistan through Iran, but the project was found to be 
neither financially nor technically feasible.21
Iran first introduced the idea of prolonging the pipeline from Pakistan to 
India to the Pakistani government under former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 
and later Nawaz Sharif.22 The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence responded 
18 “International Gas Pipeline Projects”, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, 
Government of Pakistan, 2006 [online October 2006].
19 Interview with professor working on maritime security, Singapore, 23 April 2008; 
energy and market consultant in Oslo, 27 May 2008.
20 Interview with energy consultant, Tehran, 4 September 2006.
21 Ibid.
22 B. Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties: Ground Realities”, South Asia Analysis Group, 
no. 1173 (2004) [online 18 June 2008]; Stephen Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”, 
Middle East (July 2006), pp. 44–45.
to Iran’s suggestion by advising Bhutto and Sharif not to extend the pipeline to 
India and, at first, both rejected the extension.23 But later, under the Sharif gov-
ernment, an IPI Pipeline extension to India was considered. In addition, ideas 
of prolonging the pipeline all the way to China were also proposed, which may 
reflect the historically close relations between Pakistan and China.
Nevertheless, in the middle of the 1990s, more factors prevented the reali-
sation of the project. When Sharif lost power in Pakistan in 1993 and Qatar’s 
Sheikh Khalifa lost the throne to his son Hamad in 1995, two central actors had 
been lost and the project was put on hold. However, Iran’s vast gas reserves still 
allowed for the possibility of transporting gas from Iran to Pakistan and India. 
A preliminary deal on building a pipeline from Iran to Pakistan was signed 
in 1995. However, at the end of the 1990s, the relationship between Pakistan 
and India reached freezing point, making the prospect of an IPI Pipeline utterly 
implausible. In 1998, both countries carried out rounds of nuclear bomb tests 
and in 1999, the Kargil conflict broke out. An alternative for India that was dis-
cussed was to build a pipeline from Iran to India going under the Arabic Ocean 
to bypass Pakistan. However, the lack of adequate technology would not allow 
such a pipeline to be realised.24 Tensions between India and Pakistan continued 
and not before 2003–2004 did they managed to initiate serious peace talks. 
Negotiations have been revived and all three countries declared their inten-
tions to realise the IPI Pipeline project in 2005. Bilateral meetings between Iran 
and Pakistan and between Iran and India were held regularly in 2005, and dur-
ing the six first months of the year, the first actual progress in the commercial, 
technological and legal aspects of the pipeline was made.25 
The plan is to transport about 110–130 million standard cubic metres per 
day (mmscmd) through the IPI Pipeline. Of the total, roughly 25 per cent is 
planned for Iran’s domestic use, about 25 per cent for Pakistan, while India gets 
the remaining roughly 50 per cent.26 It is estimated that Pakistan will receive 
$500–600 million in transition fees per annum from India.27 The length of the 
IPI Pipeline is planned to reach 2,600 kilometres, and the project has been es-
timated to cost $7–8 billion.28 It has been proposed that the pipeline take the 
specific route of Assaluyeh-Khuzdar-Multan-New Delhi, and a parallel pipeline 
23 Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties…”.
24 Stephen Blank, “Afghanistan’s Newest Victimization”, Asia Times Online, 13 May 
2003 [online 18 June 2008]; Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Iran to India Natural Gas 
Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and 
Pakistan”, TED Case Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2001) [online 18 June 2008], p. 1. 
25 David Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Intersection of Energy and 
Politics”, IPCS Research Papers, no. 8 (2007) [online 18 June 2008], p. 7.
26 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
27 Escobar, “The Roving Eye…”.
28 “Experts to Set Pipeline Gas Price”, BBC, 4 August 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
4/2008 tHe IraN-PaKIStaN-INDIa PIPeLINe PrOJectOSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
OF_4_2008_Innhold.indd   12 04-09-08   11:22:10
13
Pipeline Dreams
The idea of the pipeline grew out of several plans to transport natural gas from 
the Arabian Peninsula to the Asian market in the late 1980s. One idea was to 
transport gas from Qatar through Iran to Pakistan, through the so-called Gulf 
South Asia Pipeline (GUSA), and an Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between Pakistan and Qatar in 1991.18 It has always been challenging for Qatar, 
one of the world’s biggest gas producers, to transport its gas abroad. It has two 
major ways of exporting gas, either by tank ship or pipeline. The latter solution 
was preferred for many years due to the high expense of and potential risks 
involved in tank-ship transport. In recent years, the situation has become less 
clear. Notably, whereas piracy attacks on tank-ship transport have decreased in 
recent years, the risk of terrorist activities against such transportation has in-
creased.19 At the same time, shipping has become less costly. One alternative to 
seaborne gas transportation from Qatar to the Asian market would be to build 
a pipeline under the Gulf to Iran and eastwards from that point; the Gulf is only 
200–300 metres deep, ideal for building pipelines. Another possible route is a 
pipeline from Qatar through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Oman, and on 
from the Sultanate under the Arabian Ocean to Pakistan.
Two factors, however, have made the construction of such a pipeline dif-
ficult and put the project on hold. First, Saudi Arabia owns a little piece of land 
between Qatar and the UAE, and this apparently minor detail complicates the 
situation: the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been tense since 
the 1990s, when certain border disputes arose between Saudi Arabia’s al-Saud 
dynasty and Qatar’s al-Thani family. It seems safe to conclude that no pipeline 
through Saudi Arabia will be built until the two countries have come to terms. 
Second, the ocean areas outside the Strait of Hormuz reach depths of up to 1800 
metres: pressure at such depths would make building a pipeline difficult, even 
with cutting-edge technology.20 The Pakistanis were also interested in building a 
pipeline from Oman to Pakistan through Iran, but the project was found to be 
neither financially nor technically feasible.21
Iran first introduced the idea of prolonging the pipeline from Pakistan to 
India to the Pakistani government under former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 
and later Nawaz Sharif.22 The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence responded 
18 “International Gas Pipeline Projects”, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, 
Government of Pakistan, 2006 [online October 2006].
19 Interview with professor working on maritime security, Singapore, 23 April 2008; 
energy and market consultant in Oslo, 27 May 2008.
20 Interview with energy consultant, Tehran, 4 September 2006.
21 Ibid.
22 B. Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties: Ground Realities”, South Asia Analysis Group, 
no. 1173 (2004) [online 18 June 2008]; Stephen Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”, 
Middle East (July 2006), pp. 44–45.
to Iran’s suggestion by advising Bhutto and Sharif not to extend the pipeline to 
India and, at first, both rejected the extension.23 But later, under the Sharif gov-
ernment, an IPI Pipeline extension to India was considered. In addition, ideas 
of prolonging the pipeline all the way to China were also proposed, which may 
reflect the historically close relations between Pakistan and China.
Nevertheless, in the middle of the 1990s, more factors prevented the reali-
sation of the project. When Sharif lost power in Pakistan in 1993 and Qatar’s 
Sheikh Khalifa lost the throne to his son Hamad in 1995, two central actors had 
been lost and the project was put on hold. However, Iran’s vast gas reserves still 
allowed for the possibility of transporting gas from Iran to Pakistan and India. 
A preliminary deal on building a pipeline from Iran to Pakistan was signed 
in 1995. However, at the end of the 1990s, the relationship between Pakistan 
and India reached freezing point, making the prospect of an IPI Pipeline utterly 
implausible. In 1998, both countries carried out rounds of nuclear bomb tests 
and in 1999, the Kargil conflict broke out. An alternative for India that was dis-
cussed was to build a pipeline from Iran to India going under the Arabic Ocean 
to bypass Pakistan. However, the lack of adequate technology would not allow 
such a pipeline to be realised.24 Tensions between India and Pakistan continued 
and not before 2003–2004 did they managed to initiate serious peace talks. 
Negotiations have been revived and all three countries declared their inten-
tions to realise the IPI Pipeline project in 2005. Bilateral meetings between Iran 
and Pakistan and between Iran and India were held regularly in 2005, and dur-
ing the six first months of the year, the first actual progress in the commercial, 
technological and legal aspects of the pipeline was made.25 
The plan is to transport about 110–130 million standard cubic metres per 
day (mmscmd) through the IPI Pipeline. Of the total, roughly 25 per cent is 
planned for Iran’s domestic use, about 25 per cent for Pakistan, while India gets 
the remaining roughly 50 per cent.26 It is estimated that Pakistan will receive 
$500–600 million in transition fees per annum from India.27 The length of the 
IPI Pipeline is planned to reach 2,600 kilometres, and the project has been es-
timated to cost $7–8 billion.28 It has been proposed that the pipeline take the 
specific route of Assaluyeh-Khuzdar-Multan-New Delhi, and a parallel pipeline 
23 Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties…”.
24 Stephen Blank, “Afghanistan’s Newest Victimization”, Asia Times Online, 13 May 
2003 [online 18 June 2008]; Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Iran to India Natural Gas 
Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and 
Pakistan”, TED Case Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2001) [online 18 June 2008], p. 1. 
25 David Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Intersection of Energy and 
Politics”, IPCS Research Papers, no. 8 (2007) [online 18 June 2008], p. 7.
26 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
27 Escobar, “The Roving Eye…”.
28 “Experts to Set Pipeline Gas Price”, BBC, 4 August 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
4/2008 tHe IraN-PaKIStaN-INDIa PIPeLINe PrOJectOSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
OF_4_2008_Innhold.indd   13 04-09-08   11:22:10
14 OSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
could be built along it in case demand rises.29 Pakistan has already requested 
more gas.30 
Iran, Pakistan, and India have all described the prospective realisation of 
the IPI Pipeline as a win-win situation for them: Iran can sell its gas and obtain 
large amounts of revenue, and strengthen political and economic bonds east-
wards; Pakistan will get income in the form of transition fees, and more energy; 
and India will get much needed energy to help maintain growth. Describing the 
importance of the pipeline to India, David Temple wrote the following in his 
report for the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi in 2007: 
[S]ince gas imports will determine the rate of India’s economic growth, negotia-
tors should push hard to overcome obstacles to the IPI, which would provide 
the cheapest gas import scenario for India. […] although the IPI pipeline is not 
an absolute necessity in meeting India’s long-term energy security, it is certainly 
a desirable option.31
The IPI Pipeline is of similar importance for Pakistan:
Not only would the pipeline curb Pakistan’s demand-supply gap, but it would 
provide Pakistan with a much needed form of revenue. Estimates show that the 
IPI could deliver as much as $14 billion in income over 30 years [...].32
A materialised IPI Pipeline would soothe Pakistan’s and India’s immense needs 
for energy to maintain economic growth, and would bring Iran large revenues 
and new strategic partners. If this energy cooperation deal goes through, Paki-
stan and India will have a unique opportunity to enhance their relations and 
speed up the on-going India-Pakistan peace process. Finally, yet importantly, gas 
causes much less damage to the environment than resources like oil and coal, 
and the IPI Pipeline could accordingly have a positive impact on the environ-
ment in the region. In sum, an eventual realisation of this pipeline could lead 
to better economic and environmental conditions in the region, as well as boost 
cooperation.
29 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
30 Ibid.
31 Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline…”, p. 30.
32 Ibid, p. 32.
OBSTAClES
As shown above, the IPI Pipeline appears to be a prospective win-win project for 
all three parties involved, yet it has still not seen the light of day, due to differ-
ent kinds of obstacles: first, there are economic hurdles, including difficulties in 
setting the price of the pipeline gas, the significant increase in the price of steel 
and fluctuations in the price and cost of LNG, and problems related to the par-
ties’ propensity to make sure that their cooperation partner(s) do not gain more 
than themselves in a cooperation project. Second, there are political obstacles, 
including the challenge of the internal dispute in Iran about whether the coun-
try should export gas. Internal political resistance is also an issue of concern in 
India and Pakistan, partly fuelled by the strained relationship between the two 
countries. Two additional obstacles are the regional challenge of Baluchi insur-
gency, and the global challenge stemming from the US strategy of maintaining 
its hegemony in Asia.
Economic Obstacles
Iran, Pakistan and India have found it difficult to agree on the price of the gas 
to be pumped through the IPI Pipeline. In August 2006, India offered $4.25 
per million British thermal units (mBtu). However, at the same time, Iran said 
that the price should be set by “global standards” at $7.20 per mBtu.33 In mid-
September 2006, the Iranians raised their gas price to $8.25 and Pakistan and 
India offered $4.50.34 Since Indian natural gas rates have traditionally been 
lower than international ones, the country is accustomed to buying its gas in 
the low price range.35 However, Indian costumers’ willingness and ability to pay 
international rates is apparently increasing.36 It has been claimed that Iran wants 
a higher gas price from India because India voted against Iran at the IAEA meet-
ings.37 Iran has also stated that the country does not want to sell underpriced 
gas to India and Pakistan. An Iran-based consulting group suggested that Iran 
suspected India and Pakistan of trying to exploit Iran’s critical situation and of 
33 “Iran Economic Digest”, Iran Consulting Group, 10 August 2006.
34 Interview in Tehran, 18 September 2006.
35 In 2005, the prices of natural gas in India ranged between $3.30 and $4.85; Gaurav 
Raghuvanshi, “Shell LNG terminal loses only costumer”, Hindu Business Line, 4 
January 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
36 See for instance “International Energy Outlook 2007”, Chapter 4 – Natural Gas, 
Energy Information Administration, (US Dept. of Energy [online 19 June 2008]).
37 “Farsi Media”, Media Digest, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 31 August 2006.
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33 “Iran Economic Digest”, Iran Consulting Group, 10 August 2006.
34 Interview in Tehran, 18 September 2006.
35 In 2005, the prices of natural gas in India ranged between $3.30 and $4.85; Gaurav 
Raghuvanshi, “Shell LNG terminal loses only costumer”, Hindu Business Line, 4 
January 2006 [online 18 June 2008].
36 See for instance “International Energy Outlook 2007”, Chapter 4 – Natural Gas, 
Energy Information Administration, (US Dept. of Energy [online 19 June 2008]).
37 “Farsi Media”, Media Digest, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 31 August 2006.
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saying that no other country would buy Iran’s gas as long as the country was 
facing sanctions.38 
Pakistan raised its domestic gas price every three months in 2005–2006, 
thereby doubling the gas price in one year, apparently making it considerably 
higher than India’s domestic gas price.39 The reason for this increase was most 
probably the country’s fast-approaching gas shortage; Pakistan’s gas fields are 
expected to dry up by 2010. According to a Pakistani official, the higher domes-
tic Pakistani gas price was closer to the gas price requested by Iran.40 However, 
an Indian official said that Pakistan had reached the level of India’s gas prices in 
September 2006, a fact that emphasises the insecurity and confusion surround-
ing the two countries’ views on the gas pricing issue.41 
In 2006, Iran, Pakistan and India agreed to use an independent council to 
set the price of the gas; the consulting company Gaffney, Cline & Associates 
was appointed.42 In August 2006, Hadi Nejad Hosseinian, Iran’s Deputy Pe-
troleum Minister for International Affairs at that time, said that the appointed 
council would use Japan’s market gas price as a baseline to calculate the Iranian 
gas price.43 According to the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum, much depended on 
what price the consulting company would recommend. If the price calculated 
were closer to the suggested Indian and Pakistani price offer, the Iranian govern-
ment would have to lower its price; if it was closer to the Iranian price sugges-
tion, India and Pakistan would have to raise their offer.44 New Delhi feared that 
the price would be 60 per cent higher than what was realistic for India.45 
At the beginning of September 2006, the pricing mechanism had still not 
been finalised,46 but a new issue came to light: as mentioned above, the Indian 
Oil Corporation and the National Iranian Gas Exporting Company signed a 
long-term liquefied natural gas deal in June 2005, which would supply India 
with gas for 25 years starting in 2009–2010.47 However, Iran raised the gas price 
for India after the deal had been signed. India seemed hesitant to implement the 
deal because such an unexpected price increase was not a part of its contracting 
38 Interview in Tehran, 4 September 2006.
39 Interview in Tehran, 10 September 2006.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview in Tehran, 18 September 2006.
42 Ibid.; “Deadline Set For Indo-Pak Gas Venture”, Iran Daily, 10 September 2006 
[online 19 June 2008]; Interview with energy consultant, Tehran, 1 October 2006.
43 “Farsi Media”, Media Digest, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 31 August 2006.
44 Interview with Iranian official, Tehran, 27 September 2006.
45 “Experts to Set Pipeline Gas Price”, BBC.
46 “Iran Economic Digest”, Iran Consulting Group, 5 September 2006.
47 Siddharth Srivastava, “Price Imbroglio Stymies Iran Pipeline”, Asia Times Online, 27 
July 2006 [online 19 June 2008].
policies.48 In mid-September 2006, the Indian Oil Minister said that delays in the 
LNG contract would “impede the execution of the Peace Pipeline”.49 
In July 2007, Iran, Pakistan and India finally agreed on a formula for the 
natural gas price which was based on the price of natural gas in Japan, set at 
$4.93 per mBtu.50 However, the three parties had still not agreed on the review 
cycle of the gas price: Iran wanted a three-year cycle, while India favoured a 
review cycle of seven years.51 Apparently at the end of 2007, Pakistan and Iran 
agreed on the contents of the bilateral part of the IPI contract, but it was yet to 
be signed.52 The gas price issue between Iran and India seems somewhat more 
uncertain.
Up to 2004, steel prices were relatively stable, but during the summer of 
2006, there was a dramatic increase of 60 per cent, thereby increasing the cost 
of the pipe per linear foot from $77.90 in 2000 to $200 in 2006. The cause of 
the increase was a growing, worldwide demand for steel, especially in China.53 
Initially, the pipeline had had an estimated price of $4 billion, but the current 
price is more than $3.5 billion higher, largely because of the increase in the price 
of steel. In 2007–2008 the price of steel increased even more. Naturally, this rise 
in costs is another hurdle to the 2,600-kilometre pipeline project.
However, the cost of LNG projects has declined substantially since the 1990s 
and on. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) elaborated on LNG 
trends in a 2003 report:
According to the Gas Technology Institute (GTI), liquefaction costs have de-
creased 35 to 50 percent over the past ten years, with plant capital costs decreas-
ing from more than US$500 per ton of annual liquefaction capacity to less than 
US$200 for trains at existing plants (in nominal dollars). Building costs for LNG 
tankers have decreased from about US$280 million (nominal) in the mid-1980s 
to about US$155 million in late 2003. Regasification terminal costs have also 
fallen, though costs tend to be site-specific and can range from US$100 million 
to more than US$2 billion.54
48 Interview in Tehran, 18 September 2006.
49 “Iran Economic Digest”, Iran Consulting Group, 16 September 2006.
50 “Iran, Pakistan, India agree gas price for transnational pipeline”, RIA Novosti, 16 July 
2007 [online 2008].
51 Abbas Maleki, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: Is it a Peace Pipeline?” The Audit of 
Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, September 2007.
52 Gisoo Misha Ahmadi, “Iran, Pakistan finalize IPI deal”, Press TV, 29 September 2007 
[online 19 June 2008].
53 Alan C. Hutson and Russel L. Gibson, “Challenges for Pipeline Bidding in a Seller’s 
Market”, Freese and Nichols, 2006, (Texas AWWA [online 19 June 2008]).
54 “The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status and Outlook”, Energy Information 
Administration, December 2003 (US Dept. of Energy [online 19 June 2008]).
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in costs is another hurdle to the 2,600-kilometre pipeline project.
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Table 2 shows the expected development of LNG costs up to 2040. If LNG 
prices continue to fall, or at least stay at an affordable level, while steel prices 
continue to rise, India might be tempted to import additional LNG instead of 
the gas from the more problematic pipeline project. 
One of the most pressing hurdles today is that New Delhi and Islamabad 
disagree about transit fees; Pakistan is expected to receive $500–600 million in 
transition fees per year from India, but Indian officials do not agree with these 
figures and want Pakistan to moderate its demands. Although the Asian Devel-
opment Bank has found the IPI project to be viable based on economic factors 
and India’s and Pakistan’s increasing needs for energy, and the project has been 
described as a win-win situation for all parties, it seems as though India has been 
having second thoughts about continuing the joint venture during late 2007 and 
early 2008.55 New Delhi has not taken part in what were supposed to be tripar-
tite meetings since the autumn of 2007.56 
This can be explained in terms of perceptions of relative gains: states are 
worried that their cooperation partners will gain more than themselves from 
their shared accomplishments and that the other states will cheat.57 To ensure 
Pakistan does not “cheat”, India has suggested several mechanisms to ensure the 
55 Maleki, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline…”.
56 “India to skip Tehran meeting on pipeline deal”, Press Trust of India, 5 February 
2008, (NDTV Convergence Limited [online 19 June 2008]).
57 See for instance Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, 
and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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safe arrival of the pipeline gas from Iran through Pakistan. In addition, India is 
concerned that Pakistan might gain more from the project than it would. Paki-
stan has had similar thoughts: when Iran first broached the pipeline proposal to 
Pakistan, Islamabad’s Inter-Services Intelligence advised Pakistani officials not 
to agree to a pipeline extending to India since the availability of gas from Iran 
could strengthen India’s economic and industrial capability.58 This is a clear ex-
ample of how thinking in terms of relative gains can influence policy-makers.59
Although this way of thinking is not the only reason for India’s second 
thoughts, it might be one influential factor. India and Pakistan have a long his-
tory of complicated conflicts and disagreements and there is strong evidence 
suggesting that each country, when considering cooperation, wants to make sure 
that the other party does not gain in relative terms. At the beginning of 2008, 
Pakistan seemed to be tempting India back into the project by offering to re-
negotiate transit fees and make them compatible with international norms.60 
Apparently, Iran, Pakistan and India have agreed on a new trilateral meeting in 
Tehran in July 2008 to sign the contract.61 
58 Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties…”.
59 Relative-gains theorist Waltz writes: “Inequality in the expected distribution of 
the increased product works strongly against extensions of the division of labor 
internationally.” Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 105.
60 “Pak says ready to lower transit fee for Iran gas to India, invites Deora for talks”, 
Indian Express, 4 February 2008 [online 19 June 2008]; “Pakistan ready to lower IPI 
gas pipeline fee”, Daily Times, 5 February 2008, (WorldCALL Internet Solutions [19 
June 2008]).
61 “Peace pipeline talks next month in Tehran”, Tehran Times, 24 June 2008 [online 26 
June 2008].
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Political Obstacles
A conflict has been running between the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum and the 
Majlis’ Energy Committee, in other words technocrats versus politicians.62 The 
debate is about whether Iran should export its gas, and how much gas it could 
export, if any. The technocrat, Narsi Ghorban, director of NarKangan Interna-
tional Gas to Liquid Company, has argued that
[A]lthough Iran, with the current proven gas reserves, cannot be indifferent to 
LNG exports in future, the priority should be given to gas injection, domestic 
use, gas-based industries including GTL [gas to liquid], and export by pipelines 
to the Indian subcontinent and Europe.63 
A growing number of politicians in the Parliament agree only on the first two, 
gas re-injection and the domestic use of gas, and argue that these two ways of 
using gas should be prioritised.64 Gas re-injection into old oil fields leads to the 
release of more oil at the proportion of 300 cu ms of gas to 1 barrel of oil, and 
most of the gas would be recovered in the long term with the production of oil. 
Technocrats who also want to export gas point out that the gas price has risen 
dramatically and exports will improve the economy. The amount of gas that 
can be re-injected into old oil fields is limited, and pro-export technocrats argue 
that Iran can utilise less than 40 per cent of its reserves in the coming 25 years.65 
They also emphasise that gas export will strengthen Iran’s role in the region, 
and improve the economy. According to an Iran-based energy consultant, Iran 
was interested in selling its gas in 2006.66 Deputy Minister at that time, Nejad 
Hosseinian, travelled extensively trying to promote Iran’s gas export interna-
tionally. 
Iran shares its gas in the enormous South Pars field with Qatar, but the two 
countries have no joint development plan. On the contrary, according to reliable 
Iranian energy consultants, there is a contest between the two countries to ex-
tract gas; the greater the amount of gas extracted in the shortest time, the bet-
ter.67 Also, Iran wants to export as much gas as possible because it is not able to 
use all the gas itself.68 As one renowned consulting agency in Iran has noted:
62 Narsi Ghorban, “Monetizing Iran’s Gas Resources and the Debate Over Gas-Export 
and Gas-Based Industries Options’, Middle East Economic Survey, vol. 49, no. 28 (10 
July 2006), p. 25; and interview with consulting agency, Tehran, August 2006.
63 Narsi Ghorban, “The Need To Restructure Iran’s Petroleum Industry (Revisited After 
Eight Years)”, Middle East Economic Survey, vol 48, no. 24 (13 June 2005).
64 Ghorban: “Monetizing Iran’s Gas Resources…”.
65 Ibid.
66 Interview with energy consultant, Tehran, 4 September 2006.
67 Interview with energy consultant, Tehran, 4 September 2006.
68 Ibid.
Observing the trends in Iran in the last 20 years leads to the conclusion that 
technocrats always win in the end in Iran, even though it takes a lot of time and 
energy.69
For a long time, pipeline cooperation between India and Pakistan was unlikely, 
but in 2005 both countries seemed tempted by the economic benefits and tenta-
tively agreed to cooperation on the IPI Pipeline project. Although this tripartite 
cooperation is unprecedented,it has not been smooth.70 India is worried that 
Pakistan will disrupt its gas supply should tensions arise between the two coun-
tries in the future.71 Pakistan, for its part, has been concerned that gas from Iran 
will strengthen India’s economic capability.72 
India has also demanded that spigots be installed only in Iranian and In-
dian parts of the IPI Pipeline, so that Pakistan cannot stop the gas supply with-
out destroying the pipeline and thereby cutting off its own supply. India has also 
demanded that if its gas supply through the IPI Pipeline is disturbed, Iran must 
ship the “lost” amount of gas to India at the same price as the pipeline gas.73 
Furthermore, India will only pay for gas delivered at its border. Iran has agreed 
to take responsibility for the pipeline all the way through Pakistan and to the In-
dian border. Because of internal opposition to and insecurity surrounding the IPI 
Pipeline project, New Delhi is considering alternative pipelines, among them a 
gas pipeline from Burma through Bangladesh and a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline.74 Conversely, Burma has apparently chosen to send 
its gas to China, abandoning cooperation with India.75 One reason might be the 
complicated relationship between India and Bangladesh.76
India has made major new natural gas discoveries in the last few years. 
Most of the country’s gas production comes from the Indian western offshore 
area, but it has also found huge gas reserves off its eastern coast in the Krishna-
Godavar Basin. Ajay Dua of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry said 
in 2006 that India could become self-sufficient in natural gas by 2012.77 How-
ever, Dua’s statement must have been more political than economic, because to 
cover India’s fast-growing energy needs, India would need the natural gas from 
the IPI Pipeline in addition to all other domestic and international projects. EIA 
69 Interview with consulting agency, Tehran, 29 August 2006.
70 Interview in Tehran, 10 September 2006.
71 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
72 Raman, “Indo-Pak Economic Ties…”
73 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
74 Ibid.
75 “Myanmar ditches India for China in gas deal”, Times of India, 9 April 2007, (Times 
Internet Limited [online 19 June 2008]).
76 “China’s Strategy of Containing India”, PINR, 6 March 2006 [online 19 June 2008]. 
77 Siddharth Srivastava, “New Delhi makes concession on gas distribution”, Asia Times 
Online, 6 March 2007 [online 19 June 2008].
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technocrats always win in the end in Iran, even though it takes a lot of time and 
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but in 2005 both countries seemed tempted by the economic benefits and tenta-
tively agreed to cooperation on the IPI Pipeline project. Although this tripartite 
cooperation is unprecedented,it has not been smooth.70 India is worried that 
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will strengthen India’s economic capability.72 
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dian parts of the IPI Pipeline, so that Pakistan cannot stop the gas supply with-
out destroying the pipeline and thereby cutting off its own supply. India has also 
demanded that if its gas supply through the IPI Pipeline is disturbed, Iran must 
ship the “lost” amount of gas to India at the same price as the pipeline gas.73 
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wrote in its India Country Analysis Brief from 2007 that even though India has 
made major natural gas discoveries in recent years, it is taking into considera-
tion extensive imports via LNG terminals and pipelines to help meet growing 
demand.78 Nevertheless, India’s new natural gas discoveries might lead to sub-
stantial and legitimate delays in the IPI project.
In New Delhi there is domestic political division over whether to support 
the anti-Iran policy of the US. There is an ambiguity to the Indian Prime Minis-
ter Manmohan Singh’s government: on the one hand, the parliamentary coali-
tion he heads is led by the pro-American Congress Party, yet his parliamentary 
coalition depends on India’s communist parties to maintain a majority. Indian 
left-wing parties have been reluctant to support the anti-Iran policy of the US; 
they opposed the IAEA votes against Iran in 2005, they have not been satisfied 
with the US law setting the terms for the US-India nuclear deal, and they are 
encouraging New Delhi to keep a distance from Washington.79 In 2007, the 
Communist Party of India also pressured the government to complete the IPI 
Pipeline deal. 
Internal turmoil in Pakistan may also have made it more difficult to push 
through large projects such as the IPI, and such unrest might also affect Iran 
and India which need a stable cooperation partner. In late 2007, India stopped 
attending trilateral meetings on the IPI Pipeline. Islamabad has been persist-
ent in terms of completing the pipeline project at least bilaterally. Moreover, in 
February 2008, Pakistani officials welcomed China joining the project, and pur-
portedly, China said it would join if India backed out.80 But viability testing of 
such a route has not yet been performed. Also, just like India, Pakistan has been 
looking at other pipeline alternatives, which are the US supported Turkmeni-
stan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline and the Qatar-Pakistan (GUSA) 
pipeline.81 These have so far not seemed to be feasible. In addition, the long-
running Indian-Pakistani dispute over Jammu and Kashmir has still not been 
resolved.
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Baluch Insurgency and US Opposition
Another major obstacle that may halt the realisation of the IPI Pipeline project is 
that of militia groups in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. There are several 
activist groups in the area and the three most influential are: the Baluch Lib-
eration Army; the Baluch Liberation Front; and the People’s Liberation Army, 
which all have roots in local tribal structures.
Baluchistan makes up about 43 per cent of the land area of Pakistan, but 
is sparsely populated. The province is rich in gas and holds 36 per cent of Pa-
kistan’s total gas production, yet is still the poorest area in Pakistan.82 Other 
resources found in the province are aluminium, platinum, silver, gold, copper, 
coal and uranium. The Chinese-supported Port Gwadar is being built in Gwadar 
in Baluchistan, and for the Pakistani government, this port is the gateway to the 
“outside world”. Pakistan also carries out nuclear bomb testing in the province. 
The domestic Sui gas pipeline departs from Baluchistan’s gas reserves and the IPI 
Pipeline is planned to cross the province. Hence, Baluchistan is both economi-
cally and strategically important for the Pakistani government and China.83 
Nevertheless, of Baluchistan’s total gas production, the province itself con-
sumes only 17 per cent: for supplying the gas, the Pakistani government gives 
Baluchistan 12.4 per cent of the total income from gas production.84 Members 
of Baluchi activist groups claim that injustice is being exercised against them 
by the “Punjabi-dominated” Pakistani government.85 In the last two years, these 
groups, in particular the Baluch Liberation Army, have occasionally sabotaged 
the Sui pipeline as well as other energy infrastructures and railway tracks.86 
Chinese workers building Port Gwadar have been attacked by the militia and in 
May 2003, three Chinese engineers were killed in a bomb blast.87 There are fears 
that the Baluchi militia might also attempt to sabotage the IPI Pipeline. 
According to a report by Carnegie Endowment, the Baluchi activist groups 
are determined to prevent further exploration and development without their 
consent.88 The report states that the Baluchi people want an agreement about 
the equal sharing of resources. One of their worries is related to the building of 
Port Gwadar, which is, according to the ethnic group, only profitable for the 
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demand.78 Nevertheless, India’s new natural gas discoveries might lead to sub-
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tion he heads is led by the pro-American Congress Party, yet his parliamentary 
coalition depends on India’s communist parties to maintain a majority. Indian 
left-wing parties have been reluctant to support the anti-Iran policy of the US; 
they opposed the IAEA votes against Iran in 2005, they have not been satisfied 
with the US law setting the terms for the US-India nuclear deal, and they are 
encouraging New Delhi to keep a distance from Washington.79 In 2007, the 
Communist Party of India also pressured the government to complete the IPI 
Pipeline deal. 
Internal turmoil in Pakistan may also have made it more difficult to push 
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ent in terms of completing the pipeline project at least bilaterally. Moreover, in 
February 2008, Pakistani officials welcomed China joining the project, and pur-
portedly, China said it would join if India backed out.80 But viability testing of 
such a route has not yet been performed. Also, just like India, Pakistan has been 
looking at other pipeline alternatives, which are the US supported Turkmeni-
stan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline and the Qatar-Pakistan (GUSA) 
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central Pakistani government. The population of Baluchistan is about 6 million, 
of which 3.5 million are ethnically Baluchi. A project like Port Gwadar would 
bring new settlers to Baluchistan from other areas of Pakistan and this could, 
according to the Baluchi people, make them a minority in their own land. Some 
Baluchi nationalist groups strive for an independent Baluchistan.89
The Baluch Liberation Army’s most prominent leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, 
was killed by the Pakistani air force bombing his hideout in August 2006.90 
Bugti’s killing led to even more unrest and destructive protests in Baluchistan.91 
Even long after his death, the turmoil has continued: for instance on 9 Novem-
ber 2007, a gas pipeline was blown up in the Baluchi areas and disrupted gas 
supply to the districts of Quetta, Mastung, Qalat, Pishin and Ziarat districts.92 
Similar attacks on different pipelines on Baluchi territory occurred in both Feb-
ruary and March 2008.93 The Baluch Liberation Army has claimed responsibil-
ity for at least one of these attacks. This continuous conflict between Pakistan’s 
central government and the Baluchi militias makes it more difficult to develop 
new projects in the province. One might add that there is a substantial Baluch 
minority in Iran as well, and there has been some unrest in the Iranian province 
of Sistan and Baluchestan. In Iran, the IPI Pipeline could also be a convenient 
target for insurgents. 
Another important obstacle is the US and its fear of losing influence on the 
Indian subcontinent. The US has warned India and Pakistan against cooperating 
with so-called “terrorist states”, such as Iran. In March 2006, George W. Bush 
expressed his understanding for Pakistan’s and India’s growing needs for energy. 
However, before long he reconfirmed his opposition to the IPI Pipeline.94 The 
Bush Administration soon after offered to build India nuclear power plants to 
meet the country’s rapidly growing energy needs. 
Washington has also been accused of trying to hinder Pakistan from join-
ing the IPI Pipeline project by giving Pakistan generous annual “aid” and agree-
ing to sell it F-16 war planes.95 According to the US, Iran may turn to the “gas 
weapon” to blackmail Pakistan and India if the IPI Pipeline materialises.96 As US 
89 Ibid., p. 7.
90 Ahmed Rashid, “Rebel Killing Raises Stake in Pakistan”, BBC, September 2006 
[online 19 June 2008].
91 “Press unease at Baloch killings”, BBC, 30 August 2006 [online 19 June 2008].
92 “Gas pipeline blown up in Balochistan”, Topnews.in, 9 November 2007 (Drupal 
[online 19 June 2008]).
93 See for instance “Gas pipeline blown up in Quetta’s outskirts”, Daily Times, 4 March 
2008, (WorldCALL Internet Solutions [online 19 June 2008]); “Gas pipeline blown 
up”, Dawn, 25 February 2008 [online 19 June 2008].
94 “US ”Strongly Opposes” a Rival Pipeline from Iran”, Iran Mania, 16 August 2006 
[online 19 June 2008].
95 “Bush Backs F-16 sale to Pakistan”, BBC, 29 June 2006 [online 19 June 2008].
96 Williams, “Decision Time Beckons”.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated to the Senate Relations Committee 
in April 2006: 
[T]he cause of the behaviour of Iran concerning the entire international commu-
nity about what its intensions are toward a nuclear programme, the unreliability 
of that Iranian oil and gas supply has got to be taken into account.97 
Rice also said that the US’ nuclear deal with India was motivated by a desire to 
weaken any reliance on Iran, commenting: 
[I]f India has access to civil nuclear [power], they are going to forgo other rela-
tionships. It does give them, in many ways, a better option for a more reliable 
energy supply than being dependent on states that, from time to time, brandish 
the oil and gas weapon when they don’t like the behaviour of other states.98 
The Bush Administration claims that it is involved in the plan to build a pipe-
line from Central Asia to India, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
Map 2: Baluchi Areas of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. 
Source: University of Texas.
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(TAPI) Pipeline,99 and argues that it will not accept the completion of the rival 
IPI Pipeline.100 As mentioned above, the TAPI Pipeline project has not yet been 
proved to be feasible.101 Nevertheless, even if it does turn out to be viable, India’s 
Oil Minister, Murli Deora, has stated that it can only be an addition to the IPI 
Pipeline and not a substitute.102 
Since 2006, the UN Security Council has imposed new and stricter sanc-
tions on Iran due to the country’s refusal to suspend its uranium-enrichment 
programme. These sanctions have made it even more difficult for both India 
and Pakistan to join the IPI Project, as they would face problems if they assisted 
Iran in building its part of the pipeline.103 Also, current US law calls for penal-
ties against foreign companies that invest more than $20 million a year in Iran’s 
energy sector.104 In addition, the US and Israel have not ruled out the option of 
a military attack on Iran. It is clear that the Bush Administration intends to iso-
late Iran economically and strategically in the region, and is thus warning India 
and Pakistan against signing the IPI Pipeline deal with the Islamic Republic. 
Nevertheless, India, Pakistan, and Iran plan to build the sectors of the pipeline 
as separate projects, which is a way to avoid sanctions.105 
The only reason for US opposition to the IPI project is not, however, that 
the US has deemed Iran a “terrorist state”; energy security is one of USA’s rea-
sons to prevent the project. It is known that the US considers China to be a po-
tential rival in the “New Great Game”, and ideas of extending the IPI Pipeline 
to China have been brought to the table. India is also a potential competitor to 
the US in terms of global energy supplies, even though Washington and New 
Delhi have entered a new stage in a strategic partnership. In addition, within 
India itself, the country’s relations with the US can be a point of friction as not 
all Indian parties are pro-American. 
99 This is the same project as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline mentioned 
above, with an extension to India.
100 “US ”Strongly Opposes” a Rival Pipeline from Iran”, Iran Mania.
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India Gas Pipeline in Trouble”, Inter Press Service News Agency, February 2006 
[online 19 June 2008].
AlternAtIve ScenArIOS tO the IPI PIPelIne 
Today and in the near future, because of the obstacles the IPI Pipeline faces, 
other scenarios could be more likely: the first scenario would emerge if Iran’s 
negotiations with Pakistan and India were to fail. In this case, the IPI Pipeline 
might be limited to being a domestic Iranian pipeline. In scenario two, India 
would back out of the pipeline deal and Iran would send its gas only to Pakistan. 
With an Iran-Pakistan pipeline, the gas could also be sold to China in the form 
of LNG. Scenario three would be an Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline. 
A Domestic Iranian Pipeline
Should negotiations between Iran, Pakistan, and India fail, Iran could still use 
the gas itself. An Iran-based consulting agency believes that the Peace Pipeline 
would at least be built within Iran’s borders, and that it would go through Iran’s 
less developed areas.106 This would lead, according to the agency, to more jobs 
and better infrastructure in large parts of Iran’s neediest areas.107 In spite of on-
going negotiations surrounding the IPI Pipeline, the Iranians have apparently 
already planned and signed for a domestic pipeline.108
On 8 June 2006, the Iranian Minister of Petroleum, Vaziri-Hamaneh, 
signed a pipeline contract with Khatam ol-Anbia, the engineers of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. Khatam ol-Anbia was awarded the project, 
which goes under the name of IGAT-7 (Iranian Gas Trunkline no. 7), without 
a tender.109 This has made the Majlis question the Iranian government’s reason 
for awarding Khatam ol-Anbia the IGAT-7 project.110 There is a possibility that 
the project is rent seeking, meaning that the project might have been awarded to 
close friends of the regime, so that they can use it for personal interests.
The cost of the project is estimated to be $1.3 billion, and the length of 
the pipeline is planned to be 920 kilometres.111 According to the contract, it will 
take 30 months to complete the domestic pipeline project.112 The IGAT-7 will 
connect the gas hub of Assaluyeh with Iranshahr in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan 
106 Interview with consulting agency, Tehran, 29 August 2006.
107 Ibid.
108 “Gas Pipeline: Iran”, Nah- und Mittelost-Verein (NUMOV), 2006 [online 19 June 
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province close to the Pakistani border. If the IPI project materialises, Iran will 
most likely extend the gas pipeline to India through the IGAT-7.113
The diameter of the IGAT-7 is 56 inches and there are various opinions 
about whether it will be big enough to cover the gas demand of both Pakistan 
and India.114 If it can only cover Pakistan’s gas needs from Iran, building a par-
allel pipeline to cover India’s needs as well has been suggested. Others disagree 
and believe that a 56-inch pipeline can transport enough gas for both Pakistan 
and India. The outcome of this discussion, however, depends on the amount of 
natural gas India and Pakistan ultimately decide to import, and how much Iran 
will be able to export. Nevertheless, the IGAT-7 seems to be an actual project 
and may be regarded as the domestic Iranian version of the IPI Pipeline. Accord-
ing to some sources, Iran had already finished constructing half of the domestic 
pipeline in June 2007.115
A Pipeline with lNG Transports from Gwadar to China
If only an Iran-Pakistan pipeline is built, Pakistan will lose its opportunity for 
income from transit fees from India. Nevertheless, support from Pakistan’s close 
ally China might ease Islamabad’s economic difficulties. In Beijing, energy secu-
rity is a top priority: China needs to feed its fast growing economy. Consequently, 
China is becoming increasingly dependent on imported energy, especially oil and 
gas, to sustain its economic growth. There is a widening gap between domestic 
oil and gas production and consumption, which means that China will become 
more and more dependent on imports. Estimates show that China’s primary 
energy demand will climb from 1742 Mtoe in 2005 to 3819 Mtoe in 2030.116 Of 
China’s total energy consumption, the natural-gas part is expected to rise from 3 
per cent in 2007 to 9 per cent in 2020.117 Among many other areas, the People’s 
Republic has shown great interest in Iranian oil and gas.
As mentioned above, China is assisting Pakistan construct a deep-water 
port in Gwadar. The Pakistani side has proposed building LNG terminals in 
Gwadar to transform the piped natural gas from Iran into LNG and export it 
to China. This has been proposed to the Iranians, and was suggested after India 
started backing out of the IPI Pipeline negotiations in 2007. From Gwadar to 
China the LNG can be transported by rail, road or ships. The Pakistani Ministry 
113 “Gas Pipeline: Iran”, Nah- und Mittelost-Verein.
114 Interview in Tehran, 10 September 2006; interview in Tehran, 18 September 2006.
115 “Iran completes 50 % of its share for pipeline to India”, Tehran Avenue, 2007 [online 
February 2008].
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(Paris: IEA), p. 283. Mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent.
117 “China 2020 Natural Gas Consumption Seen at 9% of Energy Total”, China 
Economic Information Network, 21 September 2007 [online 19 June 2008].
of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying a railway line on the route.118 
The Karakoram Highway is already planned to follow the same course. 
Today, an increasing number of Chinese energy imports arrive by ship, 
although shipping gas from the Gulf to China is risky. Along the tank-ship route 
from the Gulf to the South China Sea, the narrow straits of Hormuz and Ma-
lacca have to be crossed, which are vulnerable to accidents, military blockades 
and terrorism. China has indicated a wish to reduce its dependency on energy 
imports from the Gulf because of the security risk of the sea route, but its grow-
ing economy has not allowed the country to do so, and in fact, its dependency is 
increasing. LNG from Gwadar will give China an alternative land route for its 
energy supplies. Furthermore, the western parts of China are in specific need of 
energy because China has built much energy-demanding industry in these areas. 
The land route from Gwadar to western China is much shorter than the alterna-
tive sea and land route, which passes the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and 
the South China Sea, before crossing the greater part of China. 
Whether an Iran-Pakistan pipeline transporting LNG to China can be real-
ised depends on Iran’s willingness to export the gas to China instead of India, as 
well as the price China is willing to pay. Some sources say that India generally 
offers better prices than China.119
An Iran-Pakistan-China Pipeline
Another way for China to secure overland supplies is via an extension of the 
pipeline from Pakistan. Beijing has earlier shown its interest in an extension of 
the pipeline from India after a proposal from New Delhi. India’s Minister for 
State for Planning, M. V. Rajashekharan, said in April 2005 that once gas comes 
to India, the pipeline can be extended to China.120 Also, the Chinese ambassador 
to India, Sun Yuxi, expressed in 2005 that:
[A]s far as the extension of the Iran-India gas pipeline to China is concerned, 
Beijing does not have any political problem with it, finding it a very good 
idea.121
118 “Pakistan, Iran agree on gas pricing formula, accord today”, website of Mekran 
Construction Company, 8 November 2008 [online 19 June 2008].
119 Siddharth Srivastava, “Iran gas: China waits as India wavers”, Asia Times, 6 March 
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121 “Iran-India-China Gas Pipeline Idea”, ArabicNews.
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Chinese interest in an Iran-Pakistan-China (IPC) pipeline is apparently very 
real.122 Because of fewer transit fees and a shorter route, an IPC pipeline is prob-
ably more financially and technically feasible than an extension of the IPI Pipe-
line to China. An IPC pipeline would presumably take the route from Pakistani 
Baluchistan towards the north across Punjab into the eastern areas of the North-
West Frontier Province through the Federally Administered Northern Areas, and 
into the Chinese areas of Kashmir. By taking this route, the pipeline would avoid 
Pashtun areas, and thus a greater risk of sabotage. Although it would be difficult 
to lay a pipeline along this route over the tricky mountainous terrain, it is sup-
posed to be possible. 
According to the private intelligence agency Stratfor, China has both the 
political will and the cash to make the pipeline a reality. However, Indian media 
have expressed that New Delhi is not taking the threat of China assuming In-
dia’s stake in the pipeline project seriously, and that any talk of replacing India 
with China in the pipeline project is mere pressure tactics from the Iranian and 
Pakistani sides.123 An IPC pipeline might become a reality if India confirms its 
withdrawal from the IPI project, which is not likely in the near future, and if the 
pipeline proves to be viable. A fact that makes such a pipeline more manageable 
is the unproblematic relationship between Pakistan and China; but India will 
not give up its spot for China just like that.
122 “Pakistan favours China joining IPI gas pipeline project”, Times of India; “China 
ready to join IPI gas project: report”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 11 February 
2008 [online 19 June 2008].
123 Srivastava, “Iran gas…”; and “China pipeline entry an empty threat”, Rediff News, 14 
February 2008 [online 19 June 2008].
SPIllOVER EFFECTS
That the materialisation of the IPI Pipeline in the nearest future is unlikely does 
not seem to be a far-fetched conclusion. However, the prospect of realisation in 
the long term is still present, at least as long as the parties involved continue to 
meet. Talks about the pipeline started in the mid-1990s, but the first real nego-
tiations took place only in 2005. Energy has been Iran, Pakistan, and India’s in-
centive to meet and the rounds of bilateral and trilateral meetings between them 
have the potential to lead to different kinds of spillover effects to sectors such 
as diplomacy, economics and security. Here, I shall deal specifically with the few 
years before and after 2005 when trilateral negotiations started.
Diplomatic Spillovers
The first and most obvious spillover effect is diplomatic. Negotiations over a 
project such as the IPI require positive action in the form of an everyday com-
mitment from the different parties to cooperate. They also require a willingness 
to make progress on that very project, separating the project negotiations from 
other potentially difficult issues. 
When India and Pakistan started looking at the IPI project in the early 
1990s, both countries appeared determined to link the pipeline to political is-
sues: Islamabad sought to use the pipeline to make progress on the Kashmir 
issue, while India demanded Pakistan lift bilateral trade restrictions and linked 
the IPI talks to conditions of transit rights for trade links with Afghanistan.124 
After the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests in 1998, followed by the Kargil con-
flict in 1999, the security relationship between the two countries deteriorated 
considerably, and probably became worse than ever. High-level talks after Kargil 
between Islamabad and New Delhi froze for a while. A round of peace talks 
between the two parties started in 2004, initially without much progress. After 
the first round of the composite dialogue process between India and Pakistan, 
the Kashmir Telegraph wrote:
The just concluded first round of the composite dialogue process between India 
and Pakistan witnessed a war of words stretched to the limits of inimical dip-
lomatic exchange. The foreign ministers of India Natwar Singh and Pakistan 
Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri said everything that one hoped would not be said, 
in a public platform.125
124 Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline…”, p. 26.
125 “‘Oiling’ the Indo-Pak Peace Process”, Kashmir Telegraph, vol. 4, no. 5 (September 
2004), [online 19 June 2008].
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However, there was also a silver lining to the same meeting: the IPI Pipeline was 
mentioned as a possible future cooperation project. After the meeting, Kasuri 
expressed that India and Pakistan had recognised the importance of access to 
energy resources in the region. This joint understanding of possible energy co-
operation made the foundation for an everyday commitment between Pakistan 
and India, which has been significant in forming the Indo-Pakistani bilateral re-
lationship during the last few years, and for the first time led the two into a joint 
project with the participation of a third party. In 2005, when the meetings about 
the IPI project first took place, they were held bilaterally. This was apparently 
a move intended to keep the focus on the Pipeline and away from political dis-
putes between India and Pakistan.126 Additionally, at that time India needed to 
negotiate only with Iran and left any necessary negotiations with the Pakistanis 
to the Iranians. Eventually in 2005, India and Pakistan agreed to keep politics 
and pipeline negotiations separate. At the end of the same year India agreed on a 
trilateral IPI meeting and the first one of that kind took place in January 2006.127 
During this first trilateral meeting the three parties agreed on most of the impor-
tant aspects of the IPI Pipeline. In addition to officials from Iran, Pakistan and 
India, major players from the gas industry attended the meeting.
In the years before de facto IPI Pipeline negotiations began, India and Iran 
had already initiated a healthy dialogue and signed a number of MoUs on bilat-
eral cooperation. They also discussed different options for an Iran-India pipeline 
(bypassing Pakistan). Furthermore, their bilateral relationship has made rapid 
progress since the serious negotiations about the IPI Pipeline started, in spite of 
the emergence of difficulties in the relationship in 2005. According to the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs: 
The year 2004–05 saw further deepening and consolidation of India-Iran ties. 
The increased momentum of high-level exchanges, institutional linkages be-
tween their National Security Councils and Joint Commission Meeting were the 
highlights in 2004–05.128 
In February 2005, India and Iran held a new Joint Commission Meeting. During 
the same year, the two parties also met in the Fourth Round of Strategic Dia-
logue, the First Round Table of Asian Ministers on Regional Cooperation in the 
Oil and Gas Economy, and the India-Iran third Special Joint Working Group. 
In 2005, it was also confirmed that the two parties had started cooperating 
in the development of the alternative sea-access route for Afghanistan through 
126 Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline…”, p. 7–8.
127 Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline…”, p. 8.
128 “Annual Report 2004–2005”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, [online 19 June 
2008], p. 6. 
Iran’s Chahbahar port.129 Furthermore, in September 2006 Iran’s President 
Ahmadinejad stated that “Iran sets no limit for further expansion of ties with 
India”, and India’s Prime Minister said at the same time that “Indian people 
are deeply interested in Iranian culture” and that “India is determined to con-
solidate cultural, economic and political ties with Iran”.130 Notwithstanding the 
pressure India faces from the US as well as India’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
programme, New Delhi continues to cling on to its relationship with Tehran, 
mostly due to Iran’s huge fossil-fuel reserves. New Delhi might be forced to 
choose between a supply of natural gas from Iran or a supply of nuclear goods 
from the US; this does not seem to be an easy decision to make.131
In the 1990s, the Pakistan and Iran bilateral relationship deteriorated due 
to difficult problems such as the Shiite-Sunni conflict in Pakistan, Iran’s im-
proving bilateral relationship with India, and different views on the issue of 
Afghanistan, also mentioned above.132 Pakistan post 9/11 changed its policy 
towards the Taliban and sided with the international coalition against this Af-
ghan group. This, combined with a visit by the Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami to Pakistan in December 2002, alleviated some tensions, but the rela-
tionship nevertheless moved very slowly towards normalisation. A number of 
official confidence- and security-building measures had been initiated by Iran 
and Pakistan at that time, but in reality cooperation in both the economic and 
security sectors was very limited between the two countries.133 In 2004, at a 
Pak-Iran Joint Ministerial Commission at which among other matters an Iran-
Pakistan pipeline was discussed, the two sides agreed to sign a number of MoUs 
and agreements and called for increased bilateral trade.134 In February 2005, the 
Pakistani news agency Dawn wrote the following right before the visit of the 
Pakistani Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, to Tehran:
The main thrust of the Iran visit will be strengthening bilateral relations by 
enhancing trade and economic cooperation, sources said, adding that in this 
context the trans-Pakistan gas pipeline to India will figure prominently in the 
discussions as will be the possibility of other joint infrastructure ventures.135
129 “Annual Report 2005–2006”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, [online 19 June 
2008], p. 47. 
130 “President Supports Stronger India Ties”, Iran Daily, 18 September 2006.
131 Joshi, “India walks tightrope…”.
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Stability and Peace”, Strategic Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 1 (Spring of 2004) [online 19 
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An everyday commitment to cooperate has developed in the relationship be-
tween Iran and Pakistan during the last few years. Although this is not due to the 
interest in the IPI Pipeline alone, it cannot be denied that the pipeline appears to 
be a strong factor behind it. In March 2008, the Tehran Times described the IPI 
Pipeline project as the “pearl of relations” between Tehran and Islamabad.136
Before the IPI Pipeline negotiations had begun, Iran, Pakistan and India 
had poor relations. The three countries’ high-level meetings have made the foun-
dation for intensified bilateral and trilateral diplomatic bonds. It is somewhat 
unlikely that a diplomatic atmosphere of this nature would have been created 
between the three countries without the negotiations on the IPI Pipeline. 
Economic Spillovers
Addressing the IPI Pipeline project group, former Pakistani Foreign Minister 
Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri said in 2004:
If our security concerns are adequately addressed, this project could turn out to 
be the economic bedrock which could buttress many more economic coopera-
tion proposals.137
After a Pak-Iran Joint Ministerial Commission the same year, the Pakistan Times 
described the two parties’ views on the reconsideration of the pipeline project, 
agreement on road transportation, and the making of an Iran-Pakistan Joint 
Investment Company:
The two sides expressed satisfaction over progress on these issues and hoped 
that agreement to this effect would be finalized soon which would subsequently 
lead to establishment of an effective communication and financial infrastructure 
between the two countries to further promote economic cooperation.138
Trade between Iran, Pakistan and India has increased substantially since the 
negotiations on the IPI Pipeline started. It is difficult to assess the direct effect of 
the IPI Pipeline project, however, and other factors such as more or less success-
ful preferential and free-trade agreements have clearly contributed to improving 
trade relations.
136 “Iran, Pakistan look to the future”, Tehran Times, 18 March 2008 [online 19 June 
2008].
137 “‘Oiling’ the Indo-Pak Peace Process”, Kashmir Telegraph.
138 “Pakistan-Iran agree to enhance cooperation in Investment, Trade”, Pakistan Times, 5 
March 2004 [online 19 June 2008].
In the late 1990s and early 2000s Pakistan did not wish to discuss trade 
relations with India before the two parties had found a resolution to their dis-
pute over Kashmir, and the conflict was accordingly a primary cause of their 
bad trade relations.139 For a long time, due to the two countries’ political spurs, 
trade between Pakistan and India only occurred through the illegal smuggling of 
goods.140 Today, India and Pakistan have still not found a solution to the Kash-
mir issue, but due to a better diplomatic atmosphere it has become easier to co-
operate in other economic areas. There are strong indications that negotiations 
on the IPI Pipeline have contributed to making this diplomatic atmosphere. 
In April 2005, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Paki-
stani President Pervez Musharraf made a joint statement, tentatively agreeing to 
revive a panel to promote trade and secure more confidence-building measures. 
The two parties agreed to explore further the possibility of an IPI Pipeline, and 
also to enhance economic and commercial cooperation in general.141 In October 
2005, India and Pakistan decided to re-establish the Joint Economic Commis-
sion after 16 years.142 Two years later, a goods truck crossed the border between 
India and Pakistan for the first time in 60 years.143 Total trade between Pakistan 
and India increased from $251.01 million in 2002–2003 to $1,671.55 million 
in 2006–2007. In other words, their bilateral trade increased by more than six 
times in a period of four years. Pakistan saw a seven-fold hike in its exports to 
India and India’s exports to Pakistan increased by six times in the same period 
of time. The balance of trade has so far been in Pakistan’s favour.
139 Raghav Thapar, “SAARC: Ineffective in Promoting Economic Cooperation in South 
Asia”, Stanford Journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1 (Winter 2006), [online 
19 June 2008], p. 3. 
140 Thapar, “SAARC: Ineffective in Promoting…”, p. 4. 
141 “India, Pakistan agree to enhance economic, commercial cooperation”, Hindu 
Business Line, 18 April 2005 [online 19 June 2008].
142 “Pakistan, India Re-Establish Economic Cooperation Commission”, Voice of America, 
4 October 2005 [online 19 June 2008]; “India-Pakistan Joint Statement”, BBC, 18 
April 2005 [online 19 June 2008].
143 “India and Pakistan in trade boost”, BBC, 1 October 2007 [online 19 June 2008].
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year 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007
Export 206.16 286.94 521.05 689.23 1,348.55
%Growth 39.18 81.59 32.28 95.66
India’s total 
export
52,719.43 63,842.55 83,535.94 103,090.54 126,262.68
%Growth 21.10 30.85 23.41 22.48
%Share 0.39 0.45 0.62 0.67 1.07
Import 44.85 57.65 94.97 179.56 323.01
%Growth 28.54 64.75 89.06 79.89
India’s total 
import
61,412.13 78,149.11 111,517.44 149,165.73 185,604.10
%Growth 27.25 42.70 33.76 24.43
%Share 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.17
TOTAL 
TRADE
251.01 344.59 616.03 868.79 1,671.55
%Growth 37.28 78.77 41.03 92.40
India’s total 
trade
114,131.56 141,991.66 195,053.38 252,256.27 311,866.78
%Growth 24.41 37.37 29.33 23.63
%Share 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.54
TRADE 
BALANCE
161.31 229.29 426.08 509.67 1,025.54
India’s trade 
balance
-8,692.70 -14,306.55 -27,981.49 -46,075.19 -59,341.42
Exchange 
rate:(1 US$ = 
Rs.)
48.3953 45.9516 44.9315 44.2735 45.2849
Table 3: India’s Trade with Pakistan 2002–2007 (in mill. $US)144
According to an article in Asia Times in 2005, energy cooperation between Iran 
and India was already mirroring relations in other arenas, including trade and 
military cooperation.145 Excluding petroleum products and crude-oil imports, 
total trade between India and Iran increased from $913.03 million in 2002–
2003 to $9,071.52 million in 2006–2007. In other words, it increased by almost 
ten times in a period of four years. Iran’s imports from India more than doubled 
in this period, while India’s imports from Iran increased by almost 30 times. Ira-
144 The country’s total imports do not include the import of petroleum products and crude 
oil. “Pakistan”, Export Import Data Bank, Indian Department of Commerce, 2007 
[online 19 June 2008].
145 Chietigj Bajpaee, “India, China locked in energy game”, Asia Times Online, 17 March 
2005 [online 19 June 2008].
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nian crude oil accounts for about 85 per cent of India’s imports from Iran each 
year.146 The balance of trade has accordingly been in Iran’s favour.
year 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007
EXPORT 654.73 918.11 1,231.39 1,188.35 1,449.67
%Growth 40.23 34.12 3.50 21.99
India’s total 
export
52,719.43 63,842.55 83,535.94 103,090.54 126,262.68
%Growth 21.10 30.85 23.41 22.48
%Share 1.24 1.44 1.47 1.15 1.15
IMPORT 258.30 266.82 410.21 702.46 7,621.85
%Growth 3.30 53.74 71.24 985.02
India’s total 
import
61,412.13 78,149.11 111,517.44 149,165.73 185,604.10
% Growth 27.25 42.70 33.76 24.43
%Share 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.47 4.11
TOTAL 
TRADE
913.03 1,184.93 1,641.60 1,890.81 9,071.52
%Growth 29.78 38.54 15.18 379.77
India’s total 
trade
114,131.56 141,991.61 195,053.38 252,256.27 311,866.78
% Growth 24.41 37.37 29.33 23.63
% Share 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.75 2.91
TRADE 
BALANCE
396.43 651.28 821.18 485.89
India’s trade 
balance
-8,692.70 -14,306.55 -27,981.49 -46,075.19 -59,341.42
Exchange 
rate: 
(1 US$=Rs.)
48.3953 45.9516 44.9315 44.2735 45.2849
Table 4: India’s Trade with Iran 2002–2007 (in mill. US$)147
It is especially interesting to note how total trade in both cases has increased 
dramatically from 2005–2006 to 2006–2007, right around the period when 
146 K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests”, 
CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2 August 2006 [online 19 
June 2008].
147 The country’s total imports do not include the import of petroleum products and crude 
oil. “Iran”, Export Import Data Bank, Indian Department of Commerce, 2007 [online 
19 June 2008].
OF_4_2008_Innhold.indd   36 04-09-08   11:22:15
34/2008 tHe IraN-PaKIStaN-INDIa PIPeLINe PrOJect
year 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007
Export 206.16 286.94 521.05 689.23 1,348.55
%Growth 39.18 81.59 32.28 95.66
India’s total 
export
52,719.43 63,842.55 83,535.94 103,090.54 126,262.68
%Growth 21.10 30.85 23.41 22.48
%Share 0.39 0.45 0.62 0.67 1.07
Import 44.85 57.65 94.97 179.56 323.01
%Growth 28.54 64.75 89.06 79.89
India’s total 
import
61,412.13 78,149.11 111,517.44 149,165.73 185,604.10
%Growth 27.25 42.70 33.76 24.43
%Share 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.17
TOTAL 
TRADE
251.01 344.59 616.03 868.79 1,671.55
%Growth 37.28 78.77 41.03 92.40
India’s total 
trade
114,131.56 141,991.66 195,053.38 252,256.27 311,866.78
%Growth 24.41 37.37 29.33 23.63
%Share 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.54
TRADE 
BALANCE
161.31 229.29 426.08 509.67 1,025.54
India’s trade 
balance
-8,692.70 -14,306.55 -27,981.49 -46,075.19 -59,341.42
Exchange 
rate:(1 US$ = 
Rs.)
48.3953 45.9516 44.9315 44.2735 45.2849
Table 3: India’s Trade with Pakistan 2002–2007 (in mill. $US)144
According to an article in Asia Times in 2005, energy cooperation between Iran 
and India was already mirroring relations in other arenas, including trade and 
military cooperation.145 Excluding petroleum products and crude-oil imports, 
total trade between India and Iran increased from $913.03 million in 2002–
2003 to $9,071.52 million in 2006–2007. In other words, it increased by almost 
ten times in a period of four years. Iran’s imports from India more than doubled 
in this period, while India’s imports from Iran increased by almost 30 times. Ira-
144 The country’s total imports do not include the import of petroleum products and crude 
oil. “Pakistan”, Export Import Data Bank, Indian Department of Commerce, 2007 
[online 19 June 2008].
145 Chietigj Bajpaee, “India, China locked in energy game”, Asia Times Online, 17 March 
2005 [online 19 June 2008].
OSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
nian crude oil accounts for about 85 per cent of India’s imports from Iran each 
year.146 The balance of trade has accordingly been in Iran’s favour.
year 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007
EXPORT 654.73 918.11 1,231.39 1,188.35 1,449.67
%Growth 40.23 34.12 3.50 21.99
India’s total 
export
52,719.43 63,842.55 83,535.94 103,090.54 126,262.68
%Growth 21.10 30.85 23.41 22.48
%Share 1.24 1.44 1.47 1.15 1.15
IMPORT 258.30 266.82 410.21 702.46 7,621.85
%Growth 3.30 53.74 71.24 985.02
India’s total 
import
61,412.13 78,149.11 111,517.44 149,165.73 185,604.10
% Growth 27.25 42.70 33.76 24.43
%Share 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.47 4.11
TOTAL 
TRADE
913.03 1,184.93 1,641.60 1,890.81 9,071.52
%Growth 29.78 38.54 15.18 379.77
India’s total 
trade
114,131.56 141,991.61 195,053.38 252,256.27 311,866.78
% Growth 24.41 37.37 29.33 23.63
% Share 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.75 2.91
TRADE 
BALANCE
396.43 651.28 821.18 485.89
India’s trade 
balance
-8,692.70 -14,306.55 -27,981.49 -46,075.19 -59,341.42
Exchange 
rate: 
(1 US$=Rs.)
48.3953 45.9516 44.9315 44.2735 45.2849
Table 4: India’s Trade with Iran 2002–2007 (in mill. US$)147
It is especially interesting to note how total trade in both cases has increased 
dramatically from 2005–2006 to 2006–2007, right around the period when 
146 K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests”, 
CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2 August 2006 [online 19 
June 2008].
147 The country’s total imports do not include the import of petroleum products and crude 
oil. “Iran”, Export Import Data Bank, Indian Department of Commerce, 2007 [online 
19 June 2008].
OF_4_2008_Innhold.indd   37 04-09-08   11:22:15
38 OSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 4/2008 tHe IraN-PaKIStaN-INDIa PIPeLINe PrOJect
substantial negotiations on the IPI Pipeline started. Total trade figures between 
Iran and India increased by five times in this short period of time, while bilateral 
trade between India and Pakistan saw a doubling.
Iranian-Pakistani trade relations have also improved in the last few years. 
In 2004, their bilateral trade had actually been declining at around three per 
cent for some time.148 The table below shows that the trade figures between 
Pakistan and Iran were low also before 2004.
year Export Import
Balance
of Trade
Total 
Exports Of 
Pakistan
%Share 
in Total 
Exports
Total 
Imports of 
Pakistan
%Share 
in Total 
Imports
1997-98 23.560 157.625 - 134.07 8627.663 0.27 10118.021 1.56
1998-99 12.126 82.353 - 7023 7779.285 0.16 943.656 0.87
1999-00 11.875 134.769 - 122.89 8568.599 0.14 10309.425 1.31
2000-01 24.000 370.580 - 346.58 9201.595 0.26 10728.918 3.45
2001-02 29.201 157.243 - 128.04 9202.218 0.32 10342.865 1.52
Table 5: Trade between Pakistan and Iran 1997–2002 (in mill. US$). “Trade between 
Pakistan & Iran”, The Federation of Pakistan, Chambers of Commerce & Industry, 2002 
[online 19 June 2008].
In March 2004, at a Pak-Iran Joint Ministerial Commission, the two countries 
made seven economic development agreements, including a preferential trade 
agreement. Among the topics discussed at this meeting was the construction of a 
gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan, a prospective Iran-Pakistan Joint Investment 
Company, as well as the enhancement of air, road and rail links. In the same 
month, Iran’s former First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called upon 
the Pakistani and Iranian private sectors to form joint ventures. At the same 
time, he made it clear that there were some hurdles to strengthening economic 
ties between the two countries. Bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan stood 
at $376 million in 2005, with a trade balance in Iran’s favour. In the same year, 
the two countries set a common trade target of $1 billion by signing various 
bilateral trade agreements and setting up a Joint Investment Company with an 
initial capital of $25 million.149 In 2006–2007 the two countries’ bilateral trade 
increased to $573.30 million. Imports to Pakistan were $405.80 million, and 
148 “Iran, Pakistan to facilitate growth in private sector”, Pakistan Times, 7 March 2004 
[online 19 June 2008].
149 “Pakistan and Iran set $1 billion trade target”, Daily Times, 24 February 2005 [online 
19 June 2008].
imports to Iran stood at $167.50 million.150 However, although today there are 
remaining difficulties in Iranian-Pakistani bilateral trade relations, both parties 
are seeking to find solutions and are still hoping for further expansion of their 
two-way trade.151
Future Spillovers
Iran, Pakistan and India have had an excuse to meet because of their joint inter-
est in the IPI Pipeline project. At many of the meetings at which the IPI Pipe-
line has been the key topic, other possibilities of economic cooperation have 
also been proposed.152 This has in turn created more common ground on the 
basis of which to meet and led to increased interaction between the different 
parties. Bilateral trade between all three countries, especially in Iranian-Indian 
and Indian-Pakistani relations, has increased significantly since 2005. There are 
strong indications that Iran, Pakistan and India’s joint interests in the Pipeline is 
one important reason behind the higher levels of trade, and just as importantly, 
for making the right environment for enhancing trade relations. It has to be 
noted that compared to the countries’ full economic cooperation potential, the 
increase is just a tiny fraction. Nevertheless, although Iran, Pakistan and India 
still have a long way to go, the stronger economic cooperation between them 
could eventually spill over to cooperation within the security sector.
When economic cooperation between states grows stronger, the states’ de-
pendence on each other increases. Improved economic relations tend to encour-
age states to develop other potential areas of cooperation. In the case of the 
IPI project, the different parties have met on a political level due to their joint 
interest in discussing the pipeline. Such meetings, when constructive, lead to an 
enhanced understanding of one another. As the interaction and understanding 
intensify, they create the fundament for building trust. This can, in turn, reduce 
the risk of conflict and even lead to cooperation within security matters. And en-
hanced trust may also increase the chances of the IPI Pipeline materialising.153
150 “Saeid Kharazi for steps to boost Pakistan-Iran Trade”, Pakistan Times, 21 January 
2008 [online 19 June 2008].
151 “Iran, Pakistan to Expand Bilateral Trade”, Developing 8 Countries, 20 January 2008 
[online 19 June 2008].
152 See for instance “Iran ready to sign IPI gas pipeline pact soon”, Thaindian News, 6 
March 2008 [online 19 June 2008].
153 These thoughts are in line with complex interdependence theorists. See for instance 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), 3rd edition 2000.
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conclusion 
As long as India, Iran and Pakistan continue to meet trilaterally, and there are 
no better and financially more attractive alternatives than the IPI Pipeline, the 
possibility of the realisation of the multilateral project cannot be ruled out. 
However, before materialisation can occur, the three countries have to solve the 
obstacles that I have discussed in this study. The most challenging hurdles, in my 
opinion, are US opposition and the politics of Indo-Pakistani relations, which 
in turn are interwoven with Indian and Pakistani domestic politics. Since Iran, 
Pakistan and India have different kinds of bilateral relations with the US, it is 
difficult for the three countries to find solutions that are acceptable to all three 
of them – and to the United States. Resistance stemming from the troubled state 
of Indo-Pakistani relations could disappear only if the two countries managed 
to normalise their bilateral affairs. But building trust after having been through 
three wars takes time. 
A domestic Iranian pipeline is apparently already being built according to 
the first scenario above. Furthermore, I would consider an Iran-Pakistan pipe-
line to be quite likely in terms of political viability. The economic feasibility of 
such a bilateral pipeline is uncertain as Pakistan would then miss out on consid-
erable transit fees from a third party. 
If India feels obliged to back out of the IPI project, China will be drawn into 
the picture. The People’s Republic has already shown great interest in Iranian oil 
and gas and is spending a significant amount of resources to build the Port of 
Gwadar. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether India can afford to withdraw from 
the IPI project considering the country’s foreseen shortage in energy supplies. 
New Delhi has already lost the opportunity of one pipeline deal with Burma and 
Bangladesh and the prospective TAPI Pipeline is still far from a reality.
A number of studies have been conducted showing how a materialised 
IPI Pipeline could help strengthen Indo-Pakistani relations. In this paper I have 
argued that the negotiations on the IPI project have already helped build bonds 
and create openings for more cooperation in the diplomatic and economic sec-
tors. This, in turn, may alleviate antagonisms and lead to security cooperation 
between Iran, Pakistan and India.
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